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Fake Drugs: Health, Wealth and Regulation in Nigeria 
 
 
By Gernot Klantschnig and Chieh Huang 
 
 
Abstract: In recent years, international organisations have warned of the lethal trade 
in fake drugs particularly in Africa. This article assesses how and why fake 
pharmaceuticals have become a problem in Nigeria and how successful the state has 
been at regulating it, based on archival, official and interview data. While we show 
that the early roots of this trade can be found in colonial times, its expansion and 
growing policy concern were driven by crises in the Nigerian pharmaceutical industry 
and the healthcare system in the 1980s. In contrast to dominant explanations, we 
argue that the rise of fake drugs in Nigeria was closely linked to these national crises 
and related global trends towards market liberalisation and the commodification of 
health. In this unfavourable context, policies to regulate fake drugs remained limited 
as they only addressed the symptoms of a more fundamental political and economic 
problem: the shift from public health towards private wealth and profit-making. 
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Fake pharmaceutical drugs have recently become a major policy concern for 
international organisations. The World Health Organisation (WHO) set up a global 
programme on poor-quality drugs in 2006 and has focussed particularly on African 
countries (IMPACT, 2011). In 2010 the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
followed suit and highlighted counterfeit drugs for the first time as a major threat in 
its Global Crime Threat Assessment, alongside cocaine trafficking, maritime piracy 
and human trafficking (UNODC 2010). Interpol also joined these efforts three years 
later by signing a pioneering agreement with pharmaceutical corporations to extend 
its campaign against so-called ‘pharmaceutical crime’ (Interpol 2014). Within these 
last fifteen years, the issue of fake pharmaceuticals has become a key concern for 
international health and law enforcement cooperation, as well as in national policy 
debates, especially in the global South.  
 
Nigeria has been a key actor in these debates, spearheading the issue 
internationally. It has gained a reputation as a forerunner in the fight against ‘fake 
drugs’ and its main regulatory agency, the National Agency for Food and Drug 
Administration and Control (NAFDAC), has often been portrayed as a regulatory 
model by international organisations (OECD 2016; Nigeria News Agency 2013). It 
has also been a place where the problem of ‘fake drugs’ was particularly accentuated. 
Already in the 1990s, Nigerian drug exports were banned in neighbouring states due 
to quality concerns and during the early 2000s it was claimed that more than 60 
percent of pharmaceuticals available in the country were fake (NAFDAC 2013). 
Widely reported scandals, such as the 1990 paracetamol poisoning and the 2009 My 
Pikin teething syrup poisoning have led to great concern among policy makers, the 
industry and the public (Alubo 2001; Punch 2009). Despite the immense policy 
concern, the rise of ‘fake drugs’ has not been sufficiently studied in Nigeria and, thus, 
this article examines how and why they became a problem from a historical and 
political economy perspective.  
 
The literature has proposed several explanations for the rise of fake medicine 
in countries of the global South, however, they have mostly been speculative and few 
of them based on empirical research (OECD 2016). First, one of the most dominant 
explanations, especially in policy circles, has been that poor-quality drugs are 
widespread because users are poor and uneducated and thus do not appreciate the 
risks involved in consuming such drugs (Nigeria Ministry of Health 1989; Adjei and 
Ohene 2015; Warsi 2016). This rather simplistic demand or ‘need-driven’ thesis has 
been successfully refuted by ethnographic research, which has emphasised users’ 
agency and knowledge about potentially dangerous drugs (Van der Geest and Whyte 
1988). A second major explanation has seen criminal or ‘greed-driven’ entrepreneurs 
behind the expansion of the ‘fake drug’ trade. NAFDAC has claimed that ‘drug 
barons [are] increasingly directing their resources into the less risky and more 
lucrative drug counterfeiting business – creating international syndicates and making 
drug counterfeiting more global, sophisticated and militarised’ (NAFDAC 2013, 4).1 
They essentially claim that organised criminals have taken control of this trade 
(IMPACT 2011; Interpol 2014; OECD 2016), although there is still little evidence for 
                                               
1 Similar statements were made in interviews with Nigerian officials, for instance: Interview with 
Director General, NAFDAC, Abuja, 20 October 2010.  
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this as this article will show.2 Third, it has also been argued that the state in the global 
South is too weak and unable to regulate the trade and especially the distribution of 
poor-quality drugs. State authorities are either out-manoeuvred by powerful and at 
times criminal entrepreneurs or the state is seen as too underfunded and inexperienced 
to regulate a highly complex sector such as pharmaceuticals. This slightly more 
evidence-based explanation has gained much support in international organisations, as 
well as in some academic studies on the topic (UNODC 2013; OECD 2016; Dukes, 
Braithwaite and Moloney 2015, 167-8). We will assess this argument in more detail in 
the context of the regulatory impact of the Nigerian state in this article. 
 
In response to these existing explanations, this article places the often-
unsubstantiated claims about the rise of ‘fake drugs’ into their historical and political 
context. Conceptually, the article builds on the few empirical studies available on the 
topic, in particular policy-driven and epidemiological studies on pharmaceuticals in 
West Africa (WHO 2005; Bate and Hess 2010; Newton et al 2012). A limitation of 
this policy literature is its technical approach to ‘fake drugs’, seeing these substances 
and their control within a political vacuum. To remedy this ‘depoliticisation’ 
(Ferguson 1996), the article draws on work by critical criminologists, who have 
explored the political dynamics behind the problematisation of certain social harms as 
well as the neglect of others (Braithwaite 1984; Dukes, Braithwaite and Moloney 
2015; Hilyard and Tombs 2007). Such an approach is especially pertinent in the study 
of ‘fake drugs’ as the categorisations of ‘fake’ or ‘criminal’ are highly contested and 
fluid.  
 
Furthermore, while much of the existing ethnographic work has been 
concerned with micro dynamics, in particular local drug use, we will draw on this 
work to provide insights into the functioning of informal drug markets (Van der Geest 
and Whyte 1988, Fassin 1985, Baxerres and Le Hesran 2011, Peterson 2014, 
Patterson 2014). A few of these works have also touched on the political nature of 
pharmaceutical markets and their control. For instance, Fassin and Patterson’s work 
on the pharmaceutical trade in Senegal has shown how the trade is firmly in the hands 
of the politically powerful Mouride Brotherhood (Fassin 1985; Patterson 2014). Our 
approach will similarly stress these political dynamics by historicising concerns about 
‘fake drugs’ in Nigeria and state responses to them. 
 
In order to historically reconstruct the trade and the politics of ‘fake drugs’, 
we have worked with a range of difficult to access data and settings. The main 
sources of data used were Nigerian state archives, government documents and news 
reports, as well as almost 100 interviews with individuals engaged in the semi-legal 
supply of pharmaceuticals and their control. This included interviews with 
manufacturers, importers, wholesalers, pharmacists as well as individuals involved in 
the regulation of drugs, who were able to provide insights that could not be gained 
from the scant documentary evidence. Interviews were conducted during four 
fieldtrips – in Lagos, Ibadan and Abuja – between 2010 and 2015, and they were also 
                                               
2 A related, yet more evidence-based argument has been made by scholars of corporate crime, who 
have highlighted the criminogenic nature of the pharmaceutical industry more generally and beyond 
Africa (Braithwaite 1984; Dukes, Braithwaite and Moloney 2015). 
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supplemented with ethnographic observation in two of Nigeria’s main pharmaceutical 
wholesale markets (Lagos, Idumota) and (Ibadan, Agbeni).3 
 
Based on this conceptual and empirical framework, the article is structured as 
follows: To define the scope of the article, we will first scrutinise the meaning of 'fake 
drugs' and the wide range of terms adopted by different policy actors. In addition to 
the contested meanings of ‘fake drugs’, we will point out the methodological limits of 
available data and studies on Nigeria. After laying this groundwork, the article will 
trace the origins and evolution of the illegal trade in pharmaceuticals and how the 
debate on 'fake drugs' emerged. It will focus on the distribution and control of 
pharmaceuticals because this area has been largely ignored in existing research and 
also because the political dynamics of the trade in pharmaceuticals and ‘fake drugs’ 
have been most pronounced in this area.4  
 
The article’s argument is that the trade in ‘fake drugs’ has its historical roots 
in the unregulated colonial trade in pharmaceuticals, while the expansion and policy 
concern about ‘fake drugs’ were only triggered later by crises in the local healthcare 
system and the pharmaceutical industry. These crises were closely linked to global 
trends of market liberalisation and the commodification of health, which intensified in 
the 1980s. While the emergence of ‘fake drugs’ was driven by this complex set of 
domestic and global historical factors, Nigerian attempts to regulate ‘fake drugs’ 
remained limited in this unfavourable context. In fact, regulatory work on 
pharmaceuticals only addressed the symptoms of a more fundamental political and 
economic problem: the shift from public healthcare towards private wealth and profit-
making. 
 
 
Defining ‘fake drugs’ 
 
The potentially lethal effects of fake pharmaceutical drugs and their contribution to 
wider health and social problems, such as antimicrobial resistance to life-saving 
medicines, has been proven by criminological and medical research and is not in 
doubt (Dukes, Braithwaite and Moloney 2015; Interpol 2014; Newton et al 2006; 
Davies 2013). However, the definition of ‘fake drugs’ and the extent of their 
availability remain highly contested. There is a range of drugs that fall into the 
category of ‘fake drugs’ and conflation of these types of drugs and the problems 
associated with each of them has helped to contribute to the poor understanding in 
academic and policy circles. Various terms have been used to describe the problem: 
counterfeit, fake, falsified, fraudulent, substandard, expired, unregistered drugs etc.  
 
On the global level there has until now been no common definition, in fact the 
terminology has had a tendency to become more diverse, the longer the issue has been 
debated. Governments in developing countries and in developed ones have found no 
common ground due to the contentious issue of intellectual property that is linked to 
these debates. For the opponents of the term ‘counterfeit drugs’, the focus has been 
                                               
3 We also conducted fieldwork in Southern China in 2013 and 2014 on the sourcing of drugs for the 
Nigerian market. For more details on the Chinese dimension of the trade in pharmaceuticals and fake 
drugs, see Klantschnig (2014).  
4 For medical anthropologies dealing with the consumption of pharmaceuticals in African countries, 
see Van der Geest and Whyte (1988) and Whyte, Van Der Geest and Hardon (2002). 
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too often on drugs produced in contravention of patent laws – laws which have been 
designed to protect the interests of originator drug corporations in western countries 
(Dukes, Braithwaite and Moloney 2015,  228-253). For instance, the French 
pharmaceutical giant Sanofi – a corporation at the forefront of current efforts to 
combat ‘fake drugs’ in Africa – recently claimed: ‘In the case of drug counterfeiting, 
it can mean the difference between life and death for a patient’ (BBC News 2013). In 
contrast, the Indian government in defence of its growing generic drug industry has 
been the strongest opponent to the term ‘counterfeit’ and defining the problem as an 
intellectual property issue, as this could make the production of generic drugs 
potentially more difficult (UNODC 2010). International health NGOs dependent on 
the supply of cheap generics have been similarly opposed to this use of the term and 
its restrictive ideas on patents (Médecins Sans Frontières 2011).  
 
International organisations have not been in agreement either. The WHO 
initially distinguished between falsified drugs, i.e. ‘deliberately and fraudulently 
mislabelled with respect to identity and⁄or source’ and substandard drugs, i.e. 
‘genuine drug products which do not meet quality specifications’ (UNODC 2010, 
184). In the case of both types of drugs, the WHO placed its emphasis on drugs’ 
adverse health effects rather than the politicised notion of intellectual property. In 
contrast, the UNODC, focuses on ‘fraudulent drugs’ – highlighting the criminal 
nature and intent of the individuals selling these drugs. More recently, the WHO has 
begun to promote the awkward consensus acronym SSFFC, i.e. 
substandard/spurious/falsely labelled/falsified/counterfeit medical products, which 
has only further highlighted the terminological disagreements and the conflicting 
political interests behind the different definitions (UNODC 2013). 
 
In Nigerian official and media discourse there has also been a strong tendency 
to conflate different types of drugs. The Nigerian legal definition of fake and 
counterfeit drugs deviates significantly from the WHO’s, as it includes falsified and 
substandard drugs as well as substances that are not properly registered (WHO 2005). 
Thus, anything not registered by the state can be labelled ‘fake’, although the drug 
itself might not be of poor quality or harmful to the user. This broad legal definition 
also makes the notion of ‘fake drugs’ very negotiable and politically potent 
(Klantschnig 2014). In the last five years, for instance, the government has placed a 
stronger emphasis on deliberately and criminally falsified medicines, which has been 
in line with international initiatives by Interpol and the UNODC. But this emphasis 
was also for domestic political reasons, as it has helped to dramatise an otherwise 
hidden health problem and distract from the ineffective regulatory state, for which the 
availability of substandard drugs most often stands for.  
 
In Nigeria as in the rest of Africa, negative health-related effects emanate from 
both falsified and substandard substances but the latter type of drugs has often been 
ignored. It is these two types of drugs that this article will concentrate on, but also 
make reference to related categories of expired, falsely labelled, degraded and 
unregistered drugs.5  
                                               
5 We follow Paul Newton’s definition of these terms here: ‘falsified (fraudulently manufactured with 
fake packaging and usually no or a wrong active pharmaceutical ingredient); substandard (products 
resulting from poor manufacturing with no intent to deceive, usually with inadequate or too much 
active pharmaceutical ingredient); and degraded (good-quality drugs that are degraded by poor storage 
after leaving the factory)’ (Newton et al 2012, 488-489).  
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Furthermore, without an internationally and even domestically consistent 
definition of ‘fake drugs’ it has been difficult to estimate the actual availability of 
these substances and their health effects. Most existing official and independent 
studies have used different definitions, and some have been quite explicit about the 
inconsistency of terms and estimates available (WHO 2005, 7). This inconsistency 
across different organisations and even within has also meant that the data on the 
availability of ‘fake drugs’ is hardly ever comparable across time and statements 
about the effectiveness of government policy based on such data are highly dubious 
(NAFDAC 2013, 6). 
 
Another methodological shortcoming of the available research on ‘fake drugs’ 
is that most studies conducted have been geographically restricted, for instance to one 
area of Lagos, and yet they attempt to make claims about the national market (Bate 
and Hess 2010; Newton et al. 2012). On the other hand, larger-scale studies with a 
more national approach, especially conducted by national control agencies, are much 
less clear on the methodology adopted and hence problematic (NAFDAC 2010, 6-7). 
 
Due to the weak epidemiological evidence available on the topic, studies on 
the share of ‘fake drugs’ in Nigeria’s market should only be seen as indicative. The 
earliest larger-scale study commissioned by the Ministry of Health in 1988 found that 
more than 30 percent of chemically tested drugs were substandard and 4 percent of all 
samples were seen as dangerous to the user, as they contained wrong ingredients or 
were contaminated (Nigeria Ministry of Health 1989). In 2005 a WHO study found 
that 36 percent of drugs were substandard, whereas 17 percent of tested drugs were 
counterfeit, i.e. they had deliberately falsified packaging or contents (WHO 2005). 
Finally, in 2010 NAFDAC conducted the largest exercise in testing drug quality until 
today and found less than 7 percent of tested drugs were counterfeit or substandard. 
However, the failure rate for antimalarials was significantly higher at 20 percent 
(NAFDAC 2013, 6-7). 
 
Overall, it is hard to ignore the methodological problems of studies on the 
availability of poor-quality drugs in Nigeria and beyond. While the numbers are ‘very 
poor’(Jerven 2013), they still seem to tell a story of a reduction in ‘fake drugs’ in the 
market over the last ten years. In part, this reduction can be explained by the changing 
definitions for ‘fake drugs’ used – definitions that have become slightly more specific 
over time. Also, as more drugs have been registered by NAFDAC and fewer 
unregistered have been in circulation, the share of ‘fake drugs’ by definition was also 
destined to decline. Government control efforts have also played some role in the 
reduction of poor-quality drugs on the market, as this article will argue in its last part 
on regulation.  
 
 
Origins of the unregulated trade in pharmaceuticals  
 
The article’s aim is to place these numbers and claims about ‘fake drugs’ and their 
control more fully into the historical and political context. Its first task must therefore 
be to challenge common assumptions in policy circles that the illegal trade in drugs 
and ‘fake drugs’ itself is ‘new’ (UNODC 2010; NAFDAC 2013, 4). The recent 
international policy concern is based on such ahistorical premises.  
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The history of pharmaceuticals in West Africa, their control and the 
emergence of poor-quality drugs have been written by pharmacists – a key profession 
in the regulation of these drugs. They have described a history of small-scale 
pharmaceutical imports for Europeans during pre-colonial and early colonial times 
and a slow expansion of the trade and pharmacy from the late nineteenth century 
onwards. Richard Bailey was the first African pharmacist to gain a licence to operate 
a chemist shop in Lagos in 1887 and only from the 1920s onwards did larger 
pharmaceutical stores open, such as Nigerian Medicine Stores and the West African 
Drug Company, which supplied missionary hospitals as well as chemist retail shops. 
Their numbers increased steadily and a new Pharmacy Ordinance was introduced at 
the end of the Second World War to register premises (Egboh 1982). 
 
Among today’s pharmacists, this pre-independence and early post-colonial 
period is seen as a time when pharmacists and government regulators were in control 
of the markets in pharmaceuticals, as well as drug quality. Nigeria’s first 
comprehensive drug policy of 1990 described the colonial system as follows: 
 
The central stores usually held sufficient stocks that could last for at least one year. The stocks 
were relinquished regularly and drug shortages in government hospitals were literally 
unknown. … Within the private sector were a few expatriate companies, which engaged in 
wholesale pharmaceutical business only. They made regular supplies to the few indigenous 
pharmaceutical establishments which engaged in retail business. The retail outlets adhered 
strictly to the law and to the ethics of the profession …. (Nigeria Ministry of Health 1990). 
 
In reality, this trade was never as law-abiding, especially not in colonial times. 
The colonial health and drug supply system was urban-based and focussed almost 
solely on Europeans and thus most Africans wanting western medicine had to get it 
through informal channels (Alubo 2001). In fact, colonial archives provide much 
evidence for the unregulated trade in medicine, particularly missionary stations that 
engaged in the first documented smuggling operations (NAI 1926). The government 
also had serious difficulties to issue licences to all the retailers of medicines. There 
were reports from various parts of the country in the 1940s about the widespread 
illegal sale of drugs (NAI 1946; NAI 1948 and 1951). One of them stated:  
 
[T]here are innumerable market women and itinerant vendors selling small quantities of the 
common brands of medicine and to attempt to enforce a licensing system against such persons 
would require a special staff and inspectorate. … It is at least open to doubt, moreover, 
whether the uncontrolled sale of harmless medicinal preparations in remote parts of Nigeria, 
where shops and stores are not easily accessible, is in any way harmful. On the contrary, it is 
arguable that the petty market trader selling such medicines is performing a useful function 
(NAI 1946). 
 
Thus, as soon as the trade in pharmaceuticals was established, so was the illegal 
import and distribution of these drugs. Even colonial officials realised that this illegal 
system was to some degree necessary as the legal system provided little or no supply 
to the majority of Nigerians. Thus, the roots of the unregulated trade in drugs had its 
roots in colonial times. However, concerns about the quality of these illegally 
imported and distributed substances were yet uncommon and they only started to 
manifest themselves in the 1980s.  
 
 
The rise of ‘fake drugs’ in the 1980s 
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While the unregulated trade in drugs was the precursor for subsequent drug quality 
problems, the trigger for the growth in the availability and concern about poor quality 
medicines were two interlinked crises facing Nigerian health care and pharmaceutical 
manufacturing. Nigeria’s healthcare system had expanded steadily from the late 
colonial period onwards. The 1960s saw the construction of several hospitals across 
the country and also a growing exposure of many Nigerians to a health system that 
had formerly been restricted to a small elite (Alubo 2001, 314). Despite the expansion 
of the medical facilities, hospitals could often not cope with the growing demand for 
their services. Medical equipment was insufficient and drug shortages became acute 
from the mid-1970s onwards, so doctors started to ask patients to purchase drugs 
outside hospitals (Sunday Punch 1976). A way to improve access to medicines was 
the expansion of the patent medicine dealer system first established in the late 
colonial period. Patent dealers were licensed to sell so-called first aid (over-the-
counter) drugs in areas that hospitals and pharmacies did not cover, particularly in 
rural areas (Adenika 1998).  
 
The real crisis of Nigerian healthcare began in the 1980s when structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs) led to an abrupt reduction of public spending on 
healthcare and the devaluation of the currency made the import of drugs unsustainable 
(Olukoshi 1993). In order to make up for the loss of imported western drugs, 
improvised production of essential medicines became more common, for instance in-
hospital mixing of paracetamol, which did not always adhere to strict quality controls 
(Alubo 2001, 99).  
 
Local drug manufactures could have made up for the loss of imported drugs, 
however, they suffered similarly from SAP. While the domestic manufacture of 
pharmaceuticals had increased significantly in the late 1970s, companies still largely 
relied on imported raw materials, which now became expensive due to the currency 
devaluation. Western companies with a Nigerian plant started to divest heavily, until 
almost all of them had left by the mid-1990s. The surviving local manufacturers 
continued to operate at low capacity and the local industry has been in crisis ever 
since (Adenika 1998, 173-8; Peterson 2014). The industry’s decline has also led to the 
lowering of standards and the more likely occurrence of poor quality products. 
 
In this context of healthcare and industry crises, poor-quality drugs became 
more commonly available. The first more widely reported evidence of poor-quality 
drugs in Nigeria appeared in the late 1980s (Nigeria Ministry of Health 1989 11-2; 
Daily Times 1987; The Guardian 1987). The most high-profile case was the 
paracetamol poisoning of more than 100 children in Ibadan and Jos in 1990 that was 
due to a falsely labelled poisonous ingredient used in the drug’s manufacture. The 
poisonous chemical was traced to one of Nigeria’s major wholesale markets and its 
origin was said to be the Netherlands (Alubo 2001, 99-100).6  
 
The 1990 paracetamol poisoning caused heated debates about the quality of 
drugs in Nigeria. This debate has been continued from the 1980s until today, in large 
part due to recurring cases of poisoning from drugs, such as another highly publicised 
                                               
6 At the same time, there were also other reports about the importation of fake medicines, especially 
from European countries such as Italy (Nigeria Ministry of Health 1989, 12-3). 
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scandal involving a locally-produced substandard teething syrup, My Pikin, in 2008 
and 2009 (Punch 2009; Leadership 2009; Punch 2009a). In most of these cases, 
Ministry of Health officials initially blamed the pharmaceutical industry for their 
unscrupulous and greed-driven behaviour, while the latter blamed the Ministry for its 
lack of regulation (Nigeria Ministry of Health 1989, 13-5). Eventually, the 
confrontation between the two camps was settled by blaming someone else. In the 
1980s and also today, the root cause of the problem was said to be Nigeria’s drug 
distribution system, particularly unregistered wholesalers and traders, as well as the 
unscrupulous importers of drugs among them (Nigeria Ministry of Health 1989, 61-
2). However, the growing role of unregistered actors in the distribution of drugs was 
only the most visible aspect of two interlinked and much broader changes affecting 
the pharmaceutical market locally and globally: market liberalisation and the 
commodification of health.  
 
 
The commodification of health and shifts in Nigeria’s drug distribution system  
 
The liberalised nature of the Nigerian pharmaceutical market and the overwhelming 
role of private actors has been highlighted by previous research (Baxerres and Le 
Hesran 2011; Peterson 2014). It can be argued here that the seeds of this system 
where sown in colonial times with the issuing of patent dealer licences and an 
emerging private and under-regulated market for medicine, which later expanded as a 
result of SAP and related policies, as described above.  
 
Linked to these processes of market liberalisation has been a trend towards the 
commodification of health described by anthropological studies on pharmaceutical 
consumption (Whyte, Van der Geest and Hardon 2002, 86-90). The changes to 
Nigeria’s drug sector since the late 1970s are largely corresponding to this Africa-
wide and global trend. First, commodification refers to the individualisation of 
healthcare and this has become especially pronounced through increased self-
medication as the major way to cure oneself of all kinds of health problems. Drugs 
have become available like any other commodity in markets and sold on the doorstep 
by hawkers, without any involvement by the state or health professionals. Second, 
commodification has also meant that health has become a commodity purchased with 
cash by consumers rather than a right of citizens. The move away from a state-
dominated public healthcare and drug distribution system to an almost completely 
private one has been the most obvious characteristic of this shift. 
 
In Nigeria this has meant that at least since the late 1980s a distinct system of 
private manufacture, importation and distribution has developed that applies to most 
types of drugs today, including antibiotics, antimalarials and vitamin syrups. Local 
manufacture has clearly been on the decline in the country since the late 1980s, as 
mentioned above. Good manufacturing standards are a key problem, according to 
interviewed regulators, and the great majority of substandard or even poisonous 
substances are manufactured negligently, as in the 1990 paracetamol case mentioned 
earlier (Interview 1, Senior Pharmacy academic, 2013; Interview 3, Senior NAFDAC 
official, 2015; Interview 4, NAFDAC legal officer, 2015). 7  
 
                                               
7 Full interview details are listed after the Reference section of this article. 
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In contrast to local manufacture, the private importation of pharmaceutical 
drugs has been an expanding part of the trade, as it is one of the most lucrative parts 
of the trade. As in the words of one importer:  
 
In this business until you have your own brand … or you begin to import you cannot make 
money. The higher the risk, the higher the profit (Interview 16, Drug importer 3, 2015). 
 
In Lagos alone close to 300 pharmaceutical importers were registered in 2012. They 
import drugs from across the world, particularly from Europe and the US, but recently 
also from India and China. The types of importers vary and can include the western 
multinational, big Nigerian importers with a large selection of drugs, as well as 
smaller entities, for instance one person importing a handful of different drugs 
(Interview 5, Senior PCN official, 2013; Interview 6, Drug importer 1, 2013; 
Interview 7, Drug importer 2, 2013). There has in fact been such a growth of imported 
drugs that their benefits to the consumer have at times been unclear. For instance, the 
importation of well-selling antimalarials has expanded immensely, although few of 
the brands on offer differ in terms of their ingredients.  
 
Based on interviews, the importation of falsified drugs focuses exactly on the 
drugs that ‘sell fast’ and well in the Nigerian market (Interview 2, Drug manufacturer, 
2013; Interview 7, Drug importer 2, 2013; Interview 8, Drug distributor, 2013). The 
importers of such drugs work closely with people involved in the legal trade, for 
instance, in 2009 a shipment of falsified antimalarials was intercepted in Lagos, 
which was a collaboration of a Nigerian businessman and a Chinese drug exporter. 
The job to falsify drugs was outsourced to an employee of a Chinese drug 
manufacturing company, packaging experts and also a person arranging the shipping 
for the batch from China (UNODC 2013, 42; NAFDAC 2013, 8; Punch 2009). In 
fact, the import of falsified drugs works not too differently and quite closely with its 
legal counterpart. 
 
There are also many more importers of unregistered medicines, whose 
products fall into the government’s ‘fake drug’ category, although their products are 
not necessarily harmful to users. Some of these importers ship foreign-registered 
drugs into the country, which are popular among some Nigerian consumers. During 
fieldwork in Nigeria’s wholesale markets many of these unregulated products were 
openly available and sometimes imported by the wholesaler directly with the help of 
friends abroad. Many of these illegal imports are vitamins or traditional Chinese 
medicines popular among the Nigerian middle class but they can also include drugs 
originally intended for the foreign market, such as UK-registered cancer drugs 
uncommon or expensive in Nigeria (Interview 6, Drug importer 1, 2013).  
 
Manufacturers and importers will most of the time distribute their drugs 
through the major wholesale markets, such as Idumota market in Lagos, Bridgehead 
market in Onitsha or Agbeni in Ibadan. These markets are essentially the nerve 
centres of Nigeria’s drug trade, where everyone will want to be represented and even 
where large pharmaceutical corporations which officially deny their involvement in 
the so-called ‘open market’ will have their products sold (Interview 2, Drug 
manufacturer, 2013; Interview 7, Drug importer 2, 2013).  
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These wholesale markets have often been blamed for being the reason for the 
widespread availability of ‘fake drugs’, as drugs are stored under inappropriate 
conditions, sold without licences and to consumers without prescriptions. Several 
individuals selling unregistered, expired, falsified and substandard drugs have been 
arrested in these markets. A few of the shop owners have also been prosecuted for the 
illegal importation of drugs, as there is a desire among many of them to move up the 
supply chain. However, this is made difficult by law, as importers need to be a 
qualified pharmacist or they have to hire one for that purpose (Interview 9, Drug 
wholesaler 2, 2013; NAFDAC News 2013).  
 
While these wholesalers are at the centre of Nigeria’s pharmaceutical trade 
and the debate about ‘fake drugs’, they are in an intricate legal position. The majority 
of them sell drugs without having a licence and they are selling drugs that they should 
not sell, even if they had a licence. However, in the drug market everyone relies on 
them. Retail pharmacies, drug patent dealers, hawkers and even state hospitals will 
buy their drugs in these ‘quasi-illegal’ wholesale markets, as there are no alternative 
suppliers with a similarly wide range of drugs available. 8  
 
In order to defend themselves in this intricate legal and political position, in 
particular against state agencies trying to regulate them and against licensed 
pharmacists competing with them, wholesalers in Idumota and other major markets in 
Nigeria have also formed powerful associations, such as the National Association of 
Patent and Medicine Dealers (NAPMED). One of NAPMED’s major aims has been to 
improve the reputation of its members who are often blamed for Nigeria’s ‘fake drug’ 
problem. Ironically, NAPMED’s motto is ‘Health is Wealth’, the same as the slogan of 
the major association of Nigeria’s pharmacists. Both these associations, as well as most of 
their members interviewed were always eager to stress that their involvement in the trade 
was not primarily for profit but for nobler purposes such as the ‘health of the nation’ or to 
‘save lives’ (Interview 10, Drug wholesaler 3, 2013; Interview 11, Drug wholesaler 4 and 
5, 2013; Interview 17, Senior PSN official, 2015). 
 
In addition to attempting to improve their reputation, these associations have 
been an important player in confrontations between wholesalers and their economic 
and political rivals, such as regulatory agencies and pharmacists’ associations. Some 
of these confrontations have been fought out in court and have been highly publicised. 
Less visible but similarly important have been these associations’ role in promoting 
‘self-regulation’ among members, as discussed below. In essence, with the increasing 
number of its members and their growing economic clout, these associations have 
helped to give wholesalers more political clout in the pharmaceutical market 
(Interview 10, Drug wholesaler 3, 2013; Interview 11, Drug wholesalers 4 and 5, 
Ibadan, October 25, 2013). 
 
 
State regulation and criminalisation  
 
The nature of the pharmaceutical market, well-represented interests of some economic 
actors and state agencies’ weak capacity have shaped regulatory policy in Nigeria. 
                                               
8 For a discussion of the concept and ramifications of ‘quasilegality’ in the field of drugs, see Carrier 
and Klantschnig (2017). 
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The limits of regulation appear largely in line with what the literature has said about 
the failures of drug regulation in weak developing states, although there are also some 
significant successes in our case that contradict these arguments (UNODC 2013; 
OECD 2016; Dukes, Braithwaite and Moloney 2015, 167-8). 
 
In Nigeria, drug quality control was promoted since the early 1990s but not 
seriously implemented until the 2000s. Two specialised state agencies were carved 
out from the over-burdened Ministry of Health in 1993 to address two very specific 
issues within the healthcare system. The Pharmacists Council of Nigeria (PCN) was 
supposed to regulate the profession of pharmacists and licence premises selling 
pharmaceuticals but instead it has been involved in a series of court battles with 
pharmaceutical wholesalers and patent dealers who challenged the agency’s licensing 
authority (Interview 1, Senior PCN official, 2013; Interview 10, Drug wholesaler 3, 
2013). These confrontations in court and their inconclusive outcomes meant that the 
PCN was denied any clear regulatory influence over these economic actors. Since 
1993 very few licences have in fact been issued and traders have circumvented PCN 
regulation successfully. Without licences, traders have grown so fast in number that 
their own association had to take a restrictive self-regulatory stance issuing fewer new 
memberships and thus trying to reduce the number of new entrants and curtail 
competition in the market (Interview 9, Drug wholesaler 2, 2013; Interview 12, Drug 
wholesaler 6, 2013; Interview 13, Drug wholesaler 7, 2013). 
 
From 2001 onwards, the second agency created, NAFDAC, gained more 
national prominence due to its charismatic and publicity-savvy Director General Dora 
Akunyili (2001-2008). Compared to other state agencies, NAFDAC’s budget rose 
steadily in the first few years under Akunyili’s control. Financially, it was also helped 
by its own efforts to increase registration of drug and food items, as a share of the 
registration fees was kept by the agency itself and at times illegally diverted by senior 
agency officials (Vanguard 2015). Simply based on the appearance of its facilities, 
such as exceptionally good electricity supplies in all its major offices, NAFDAC has 
been much better funded than comparable state agencies (Klantschnig 2009, 47).9  
 
NAFDAC has also been in a relatively strong financial position because it has 
nurtured and benefited from close state-business relations. Some of NAFDAC’s 
regulatory initiatives have been funded by the pharmaceutical corporations which it is 
supposed to regulate. For instance, many of NAFDAC’s public events and 
publications are sponsored by major pharmaceutical corporations interested in good 
relations with the agency (NAFDAC 2013a). Thus, NAFDAC’s close relations with 
the pharmaceutical industry, which is much more important in this field than support 
from traditional donor countries, have financially benefited the agency as a whole and 
some of its agents individually. These close relations have encouraged some corrupt 
practices and the agency’s dependence on large corporations – dynamics familiar 
from studies on the pharmaceutical sector elsewhere (Dukes, Braithwaite and 
Moloney 2015).  
 
In terms of regulation, NAFDAC has taken a dual approach to regulate the 
drug distribution system, which it also sees as the root cause of Nigeria’s ‘fake drug’ 
                                               
9 There have been some recent reports that NAFDAC is facing electricity shortages like most other 
Nigerian state agencies, even in its Lagos offices (New Telegraph 2016). 
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problem. First, since 2001 NAFDAC has attempted to ‘enlighten Nigerians’ about the 
dangers of using poor quality and unregistered drugs, especially through the media. A 
significant share of the publicity was also very person-centred, promoting Akunyili’s 
career ambitions. Indirectly, however, these efforts have shown some success at 
creating greater consumer awareness in Nigeria. Based on anecdotal evidence gained 
during fieldwork in Lagos and Ibadan between 2005 and 2007, many more Nigerians 
were aware of the drug-related work of NAFDAC rather than its sister agency dealing 
with illegal drugs. In urban areas at least, drug users seemed to be very aware of 
NAFDAC’s message that only registered drugs were safe to consume.  
 
Assuming that the availability of poor-quality drugs in the Nigerian market 
decreased over the last ten years, as claimed by most drug quality surveys, then this is 
partly an outcome of the information campaigns and efforts to register drugs. This 
aspect of regulation can be seen as a success of the work of NAFDAC, quite in 
contrast to the generally negative appraisals of regulation in the global South in the 
literature (UNODC 2013; OECD 2016; Dukes, Braithwaite and Moloney 2015, 167-
8). In addition, these information campaigns as well as changed consumer behaviour 
have also led to much stronger self-regulation among the sellers of drugs in Nigeria. 
During fieldwork in South-Western Nigeria’s major wholesale markets, special 
efforts have clearly been made to enforce drug quality standards in order to maintain 
the reputation of these markets among consumers. Pharmaceutical traders in Idumota 
and Agbeni prided themselves of their own so-called ‘Taskforce’, which regulates the 
activities of new and established wholesalers (Interview 9, Drug wholesaler 2, 2013; 
Interview 12, Drug wholesaler 6, 2013). 
 
There has also been a second type of approach, criminalisation, which has 
been much less conciliatory. NAFDAC has at several occasions taken more draconian 
measures to ‘sanitise drug markets’ (Interview 14, Senior NAFDAC official, 2013; 
Interview 15, NAFDAC official, 2013). This has usually meant the arrest of 
unlicensed smaller-scale dealers of drugs and the seizure of their products. The most 
drastic measures of this type have been police-assisted closures of drug markets in 
Onitsha, Lagos and Kano. These have often met with strong resistance from the 
traders involved and at times there were violent counter-attacks at NAFDAC and its 
officials, including attacks at Akunyili herself (Daily Trust 2012; Comet 2004).  
 
However, drug markets are usually reopened after a few weeks of closure and 
the supply of drugs continues. If these measures are seen as ways to eradicate the sale 
of poor-quality drugs by unlicensed traders, they can be considered unsuccessful. 
These traders and their products are simply pushed underground for short periods of 
time. This is in large part due to the inexistence of any available alternatives to the 
current distribution and wholesale system from where Nigerians could purchase drugs 
that are in high demand. 
 
Despite their limitations, it can be argued that these draconian measures to 
‘sanitise’ or disrupt the unregistered trade can be seen as part of the regulatory work 
of NAFDAC. As Gill (2002) has argued, policing and law enforcement are not too 
dissimilar from the regulatory work of state agencies and often overlap with them. 
NAFDAC’s recent emphasis on policing or cracking down on unregistered drugs 
could thus be seen as part of the regulatory spectrum, as it helps to enforce self-
regulation among traders. The threat of closure or disruption to drug markets acts as a 
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means to strengthen what Gill calls ‘enforced self-regulation.’ Wholesalers and 
traders’ strong concern over compliance with NAFDAC and even reproducing 
NAFDAC’s ‘taskforce-style’ of regulation among themselves is evidence of this 
effect of draconian measures on self-regulation. The same can be said about the 
adoption of NAFDAC discourse on ‘stamping out fake drugs’ among drug traders.  
 
In general, the effectiveness of this criminalisation-focussed approach is 
doubtful.10 On the one hand, criminalising the ‘fake drug’ problem has meant that 
NAFDAC has received some positive media coverage, it has led to the short-term 
disruption of the unregulated pharmaceutical market and – to some degree – 
contributed to a level of ‘enforced self-regulation’ among the traders most anxious 
about their reputation. On the other hand, the impact of this approach has been 
limited, as it has diverted attention away from the long-term regulatory problems 
caused by liberalisation and commodification, in particular the local industry’s 
continued decline and related poor manufacturing standards leading to substandard 
drug production. Criminalisation has also closed off or at least redirected policy 
resources from other approaches of regulation that NAFDAC had been quite 
successful at, such as expanding product registration and consumer and trader 
awareness campaigns.  
 
 
Conclusions  
 
The Nigerian policies discussed need to be understood within the wider context of the 
public healthcare sector and the pharmaceutical market in Nigeria. With the continued 
deterioration of public healthcare, there has been a strong shift away from relying on 
state health facilities towards the privatisation of healthcare and liberalisation of 
related markets. In the field of drug distribution, this has meant that Nigerians had to 
acquire their medicines from private sources rather than the state hospitals and health 
centres prevalent in the 1970s (Baxerres and Le Hesran 2011). Related to the greater 
role for private actors has been the commodification of health – an Africa-wide and 
global phenomenon – that was well-illustrated through the Nigerian case study 
(Whyte, Van der Geest and Hardon 2002). Commodification has led to a greater 
emphasis on self-medication and health has quite literally become a commodity 
purchased with cash in ‘open markets’. This has also led to wealth becoming a 
determining factor for gaining access to quality healthcare and drugs.  
 
The shift away from a state-dominated healthcare and drug distribution system 
has also meant that Nigerian consumers of pharmaceuticals have been much more 
exposed to the mechanics of global pharmaceutical markets and their dominant actors: 
pharmaceutical corporations in the West and more recently also in the East. These 
corporations’ major incentive, in line with most other actors in the Nigerian market 
today, has been the accumulation of corporate wealth rather than national health 
(Gereffi 1984; Braithwaite 1984; Peterson 2014). While the Nigerian debate about 
‘fake drugs’ and some of the dominant explanations for the ‘fake drug’ problem have 
often blamed the unscrupulous activities of domestic market actors, such as 
unlicensed wholesalers, traders and pharmacists, surprisingly little was said in this 
                                               
10 For a discussion of the experience of such policies in the field of other illegal substances, see 
Klantschnig (2016) and Carrier and Klantschnig (2012). 
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debate about the global actors dictating the terms of the pharmaceutical trade, which 
have a long and documented history of perpetrating serious harms (Braithwaite 1984, 
Dukes, Braithwaite and Moloney 2015; Whyte and Wiegratz 2016).  
 
Furthermore, this article has also challenged some of the dominant and 
speculative explanations for the rise in ‘fake drugs’ in the global South. As stated at 
the outset, this rise had little to do with the ‘uneducated’ nature of consumers or with 
organised criminals entering the market. In fact, there was little evidence for 
organised crime in the ‘fake drug’ trade. Instead, our research has shown that the 
trade in falsified drugs had more in common and many links to the licit trade in 
pharmaceuticals and its historical evolution. The emphasis on the criminal and 
fraudulent nature of the ‘fake drug’ problem in policy discourse has instead diverted 
attention away from the complexity of ‘fake drugs’, in particular the substandard 
production of pharmaceuticals. 
 
Finally and in contrast to another dominant explanation, it has been argued 
that the Nigerian state was somewhat successful at regulating aspects of the drug 
distribution system, especially through NAFDAC’s initiatives to reduce the 
availability of ‘fake drugs’ in the market. This was achieved through close relations 
with the industry, particularly through greater product registration, as well as 
widespread public information campaigns. This relative regulatory success challenged 
dominant explanations in the literature, which were much more pessimistic about 
regulation in the global South.  
 
Nonetheless, the agency’s work remained limited, as it only aimed to fix an 
isolated technical policy problem: the regulation of drug quality. But due to this 
narrow focus it was destined to ignore the larger political economy issues without 
which its policies could not succeed, particularly the decaying public healthcare 
system, the decline of the local pharmaceutical industry as well the unfavourable 
terms of the global pharmaceutical trade, all of which were not within its control. 
Thus, while NAFDAC’s regulatory work was relatively successful on a technical 
level, its impact remained limited in this global and local political context that was 
characterised by a much more fundamental problem: the shift from public healthcare 
towards private profit-making and wealth. 
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